Conservation Ethics Workshop
Most treatments of environmental ethics focus on abstract ethical theory which is then used to identify (really create) ethical problems in the realm environmentalism, conservation, and the management of natural resources. The result is often a top-down, ivory-towerish, and somewhat contrived treatment of environmental ethics. This workshop represents a significant departure from this approach. Our first premise is that environmental ethicists and environmental scientists have a common goal, i.e., to better understand how to relate to nature. Nevertheless, these two groups employ wildly different methods and premises, and sadly these scholars rarely interact. This workshop is essentially a synthesis between ethics and ecology.
This three-day workshop includes the presentation of concepts and case studies interspersed with smaller- and larger-group discussions, activities designed to internalize core concepts, and time for informal socialization for the purpose of developing a deeper sense of the concepts.
for Ecologists & Natural Resource Professionals
1. What is ethics and how is it related to natural resource management?
[doc] Nelson MP and JA Vucetich. 2011. Environmental Ethics and Wildlife Management. In: Human Dimensions of Wildlife Management (eds. Siemer W, D Decker, S. Riley) Johns Hopkins University Press.
This paper explains the relationship between natural resource management and environmental ethics, and describes the theories and methods used to address ethical issues in natural resource management. Much of the workshop will involve practicing the techniques described in this document.
2. Should scientists be advocates?
[pdf] Nelson MP & JA Vucetich. 2009a. On Advocacy by Environmental Scientists: What, Whether, Why, and How. Conservation Biology 23:1090-1101.
The question of whether scientists ought to be advocates is one of the most pervasive, persistent, contested, and confused questions confronting scientists and natural resource managers. This paper offers a comprehensive review of the debate over advocacy by environmental scientists and forwards an argument suggesting that scientists can, and indeed should, be advocates. It also suggests guidelines for how exactly scientists should and should not be advocates. This paper is important because it demonstrates the techniques that are described in the first reading of the workshop.
3. What is an endangered species?
[pdf] Vucetich JA, MP Nelson, & MK Phillips. 2006. The normative dimension & legal meaning of ‘endangered’ & ‘recovery’ within the United States’ Endangered Species Act. Conservation Biology 20:1383-1390.
[pdf] Waples RS, PB Adams, J Bohnsack, and BL Taylor. 2007a. A biological framework for evaluating whether a species is threatened or endangered in a “significant portion of its range.” Conservation Biology 21:964–974.
[pdf] Nelson MP, M Phillips, & J A Vucetich. 2007a. Normativity & the meaning of endangered, a comment on Waples et al. 2007. Conservation Biology 21:1646–1648.
[pdf] Waples RS, PB Adams, J Bohnsack, and BL Taylor. 2007b. Normativity redux. Conservation Biology 21:1649–1650.
The purpose of these papers is to highlight the challenges that arise from bringing together science (which is the pursuit of objective, empirical knowledge) and ethics (which involves the rational evaluation of value-laden ideas). Assessing whether a species is endangered entails a fundamentally normative dimension (i.e., specifying conditions of endangerment) and a fundamentally scientific dimension (i.e., determining whether a species meets the conditions of endangerment). Circumstances are similar for assessing whether an ecosystem is healthy, or for assessing the carrying capacity of a given ecosystem, or for whether a given population is an evolutionarily significant unit, etc.. In fact, many of our most important conservation concepts are value-laden, yet seldom do we recognize and almost never do we adequately treat this dimension within natural resource management.
4. The conflict between conservation and animal welfare.
[pdf] Vucetich JA & MP Nelson. 2007b. What are 60 warblers worth?: killing in the name of conservation. Oikos 116, 1267-1278.
[doc] Vucetich JA & MP Nelson. 2010. Resolving the conflict between conservation and animal welfare. unpublished ms.
Concern for the welfare of animals often runs against concerns for conservation. To name one example, those acting on behalf of animal welfare are likely to oppose killing cowbirds to save endangered warbler populations. While conflicts like these seem routine in conservation, thoughtful ways to remedy this impasse seem tragically nonexistent.
The first of these papers (“60 Warblers”) is important because it demonstrates the techniques that are described in the first reading for the workshop. The second of these readings (“Resolving the Conflict”) is important because it reflects a form of ethical thinking known as Virtue Ethics that might help resolve the dilemma and provide a different focus for conservation.
I. Argument Analysis. –
B. At this website, < http://www.fallacyfiles.org/>, you can find two documents, “What is a logical fallacy?”, and “Taxonomy of fallacies.” The first is worth reading and the second is worth perusing.
C. Copi and Cohen (1998, Introduction to Logic. Prentice-Hall) is a comprehensive and accessible textbook that is entirely devoted to argument analysis.
II. Ethical Discourse: another resource. –
Chase LC, Siemer WF, Decker DJ. 2008. Designing stakeholder involvement strategies to resolve wildlife management controversies. Wildl. Soc. Bull. 30: 937-950. [pdf]
III. Overviews on the nature of environmental ethics. –
A. Nelson, M. P. 2002. Introduction to environmental ethics. Pages 41-47 in The Biodiversity Project (eds.), Ethics for a small planet, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI [pdf]
B. Pojman LP and P Pojman (2008, Environmental Ethics: Readings in Theory and Application, Wadsworth Press) is wonderful collection of essays in environmental ethics. Collectively they give a useful overview of the field from an ethicist’s perspective.
IV. Schools of thought in environmental ethics: some remarks and a few resources. –
Over the past two thousand years, western ethical thought has included three major schools of thought, Virtue Theory, Deontology, and Consequentialism. The dominant ethical framework for the past 150 years has been Utilitarianism, which is a kind of Consequentialism and holds that moral actions are those whose future consequences are good, insomuch as they produce the most utility, happiness, or pleasure for the most people. Good reason suggests that the institutionalization of utilitarianism has fueled our poor relationship with nature.
What we now call Virtue Theory had been the dominant framework for more than two thousand years, up until the Enlightenment. Virtue Theory holds that right action rises from people who are manifestly virtuous, and that moral education ought to focus on identifying precisely which virtues ought to be manifest (e.g., fairness or generosity) and how to cultivate such virtues. Some think Virtue Theory should be applied systematically to environmental ethics.
Also, a variety of concepts and distinctions have risen from the past century of thought in environmental ethics. Among these are anthropocentrism vs. non-anthropocentrism, ecocentrism vs. biocentrism, conservation vs. preservation, and intrinsic value vs. use value.
A. Brennan, Andrew, Lo, Yeuk-Sze, "Environmental Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/ethics-environmental/>
B. Devall B and Sessions G. Deep Ecology (reprinted as essay 24 in Pojman and Pojman [2008])
C. Callicott, J. B. 1987. The conceptual foundations of the land ethic. (reprinted as essay 18 in Pojman and Pojman [2008])
D. Paden R. Two kinds of Preservationist Ethics (reprinted as essay 21 in Pojman and Pojman [2008])
E. Kury, C. 1975. Gifford Pinchot’s Philosophy. Journal of Forestry. Page 154-155 of March Issue.
F. Leopold, A. 1947. The Land Ethic.
V. Should scientists be advocates: a few more resources. –
A. Putnam, H. (2002) The collapse of the fact/value dichotomy and other essays. Harvard Univ Press. Pages 7-64 are especially relevant.
B. Bazzaz et al. 1998. Ecological Science and the Human Predicament. Science 30 October 1998, page 879. [pdf]
C. Wooster WS 1998. Science, advocacy, and credibility. Science 282(5395): 1823-1824 – A one-page letter to the editor expressing serious reservation against being an advocate. This letter is a response to the short letter by Bazzaz et al. [pdf]
D. Ludwig, D; Mangel, M; Haddad, B. 2001. Ecology, conservation, and public policy. Ann. Rev. Ecol. & Syst., 32: 481-517 [pdf]
E. Lach D, List P, Steel B, et al. 2003. Advocacy and credibility of ecological scientists in resource decision-making: A regional study. Bioscience 53(2): 170-178. [pdf]
VI. The conflict between conservation and animal welfare: another resource. –
Mitman, G. 2005. Pachyderm personalities: The media of science, politics, and Conservation. In: Thinking with Animals, eds: L Daston & G. Mitman, Columbia University Press
VII. The ethical dimension of sustainability: some remarks and a few resources. –
We all agree: Achieving sustainability is the central issue of our generation. Aside from the challenges of how we can become sustainable, contention continues to simmer over basic issues like what it even means to be sustainable and what new knowledge is required to become sustainable. One manifestation of this contention is the exclusive manner that various academic quarters sometimes portray the nature of sustainability: Too many environmental scientists think sustainability is primarily about documenting and protecting ecosystem health; Too many engineers think sustainability is primarily about more efficiently meeting human needs. In the evolving dialogue to better understanding whether sustainability is more about technology, ecology, or social science, a fundamental dimension of sustainability has gone almost entirely unaccounted. That is, the ethical dimension. The very meaning of sustainability will depend on several unresolved and underappreciated ethical issues.
A. Vucetich JA & MP Nelson. 2010. Sustainability: virtuous or vulgar?. Bioscience. in press
B. Nelson MP & Vucetich JA. 2009. True sustainability needs an ethical revolution. The Ecologist. Online Dec 31, 2009.
C. Kajikawa Y. 2008. Research core and framework of sustainability science. Sustainability Science 3: 215-239. [pdf]
VIII. Anthropomorphism: some remarks and a few resources. –
Anthropomorphism is also more important to conservation than may be obvious. Anthropomorphism also has an under-appreciated complexity that rises from being a synthesis of normative concepts and objective meaning. Among conservationists, anthropomorphizing represents an empirical mistake, an error-in-fact, and more specifically the misattributing a non-human with a distinctively human attribute, especially various cognitive attributes such as emotions, intelligence, or sentience.
Because it affects every aspect of life, conservation cannot expect to operate in isolation from other human enterprises and values. Thus, the success of conservation requires its conceptual foundations be at least consistent, if not well integrated, with other justified enterprises and values. From this context, complexity rises by appreciating that the conservationist’s conception of anthropomorphism tends to differ from academic fields and by appreciating the history of concepts associated with anthropomorphism. These disciplinary differences and historical context show how the conservationist’s sense of anthropomorphism is not well integrated into other domains of life. Better understanding these variances is the first step to better integrated conservation, and the purpose of this week’s discussion.
B. Plooij, F. 2000. A slap in the face. Page 88 in Bekoff, M. (ed.) 2000. The Smile of a Dolphin: Remarkable Accounts of Animal emotions. Random House/Discovery Books.
C. Dugatkin L. 2000. Risking it all for love. Page 66 in Bekoff, M. (ed.) 2000. The Smile of a Dolphin: Remarkable Accounts of Animal emotions. Random House/Discovery Books.
D. van Bogaert, LJ. 2004. Sentience and moral standing. South African Journal Of Philosophy 23 (3): 292-301.
F. Chandroo KP, IJH Duncan, RD Moccia. 2004. Can fish suffer?: perspectives on sentience, pain, fear and stress. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 86 (2004) 225–250. [pdf]
G. Sober, E. 2005. Comparative Psychology meets Evolutionary Biology: Morgan’s Canon and Cladistic Parsimony. In: Thinking with Animals, eds: L Daston & G. Mitman, Columbia University Press.
H. DeWaal. 1999. Anthropomorphism and anthropodenial: Consistency in our thinking about humans and other animals. Philosophical Topics 27:255-280.
I. Duncan, IJH. 2006. The changing concept of animal sentience. Applied Animal Behaviour Science 100 (1-2): 11-19.
J. Bekoff, M. 2006. Animal passions and beastly virtues: Cognitive ethology as the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals. Zygon 41 (1): 71-104.
IX. Is there Hope?: some remarks and a few resources. –
While scholars have begun to argue for a systematic application of virtue theory to environmental ethics, relatively little has been done to understand precisely how Virtue theory can be implemented. A challenge for any application of Virtue Theory is to properly identify which virtues ought to be promoted. What should count as a virtue is not universal, and not always obvious. For example, among warrior nations like the Crow of North America, courage was the dominant virtue. Among the Inuit, euthanasia of the elderly had been virtuous. This week we’ll review in more detail the nature of virtue theory and consider the value of “hope” and other concepts as virtue for environmental ethics.
A. Webb, C. O. (2005) Engineering Hope. Conservation Biology 19(1):275-277. – This essay provides some idea about how the idea of “hope" is used to motivate conservation. [pdf]
B. Nelson MP and JA Vucetich. 2009. Abandon Hope. The Ecologist, March 2009.
C. Cooper, D. & S. James (2005) Buddhism, Virtue, & Environment. Ashgate. [pp.1-12] – This is a very succinct overview of Virtue ethics and Environmental Ethics.
D. Brennan, A. & Y-S Lo. 2002. "Environmental Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2002/entries/ethics-environmental/
Section 4 of this article highlights two important alternatives to virtue ethics (i.e., deontology and consequentialism).
E. Hursthouse, R. 2003. "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/ethics-virtue/
WHAT YOU SHOULD BRING TO THE WORKSHOP
Friday, August 27th, 2010
11-12 INTRODUCTION
12-1pm *LUNCH
1-6pm AFTERNOON SESSION
6-8pm *DINNER
Saturday, August 28th
8-9am PRESENTATION
9-12 MORNING SESSION
12-1pm *LUNCH
1-5pm AFTERNOON SESSION
5-8pm *DINNER and evening presentation
Sunday, August 29th
8-9am FINAL PREPARATION FOR GROUP PRESENTATIONS
9-12pm GROUP PRESENTATIONS
12-1pm **LUNCH
1-2pm FINISH GROUP PRESENTATIONS
*Sharing meals with the workshop participants is part of the workshop. Attendance at meals is expected. For the lunches, we will order pizza or sandwiches and have them delivered to the workshop. For dinners, we will meet at a restaurant (the location to be announced later).
** For Sunday’s lunch, you should bring a bag lunch that you’ll eat at the workshop.
NATURE OF THE WORKSHOP
WORKSHOP SCHEDULE
1) Laptop computer
2) Hardcopies of articles assigned to be read prior to class - listed below
3) Notebook, pencils or pens
4) Money for meals (The two lunches and two dinners you’ll need should cost ~$45, not including drinks.)
5) Bag lunch for Sunday’s lunch.
6) Cup(s) to drink from during the workshop (We’ll provide pop, coffee, tea.)
REQUIRED READINGS
Prior to the workshop, you should read the papers listed below. Be prepared to discuss them during the workshop. The readings are divided into four topics. For each of the four topics, write a ~200-word reflection on the materials discussed in the paper(s). You will turn in a copy of these reflections at the start of the workshop on Friday at 11am. (Save a copy for yourself to use in class.) FAILURE TO PREPARE THESE REFLECTIONS WILL RESULT IN A FAILING GRADE.
ADDITIONAL TOPICS & RESOURCES
YOUR GRADE AND PARTICIPATION
Your grade will be either pass or fail. A passing grade requires handing in four ~200-word reflections on the four sets of papers described below. The papers should be read and the reflections have been written PRIOR to the workshop. Your grade will also be based on participation in the workshop. The central activity of the workshop will be the development of an ethical analysis like those presented in Vucetich and Nelson (2007b) and Nelson and Vucetich (2009a). These ethical analyses will be developed in small working groups of 3 or 4 workshop participants. Your group will decide the topic of your ethical analysis.
BELOW IS AN ANNOTATED LIST OF ADDITIONAL TOPICS AND RESOURCES. YOU MAY CHECK SOME OF THESE RESOURCES OUT PRIOR TO CLASS, BUT DOING SO IS NOT REQUIRED.